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THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
NEW ORDERS, PRODUCTION, AND
SHIPMENTS2
THEROLE OF ORDERS IN
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Manufacture to Stock and to Order
Two Contrasting Models and Their Significance
It will be helpful to introduce two simple models: one, pure produc-
tion to stock, and the other, pure production to order. In the first, new
orders are shipped immediately upon receipt and hence are virtually
synchronous with and equal to shipments. Orders that cannot be so
filled are either not placed or not accepted; thus, in the absence of ad-
vance orders in the real sense, there are no backlogs. The firm has to
maintain, at all times, a sufficiently large unsold inventory of finished
products to meet current sales. In contrast, the second case, by assum-
ing production to order only, implies that there are no unsold stocks of
the finished product.' Lacking such stocks, the firm cannot, of course,
handle orders for immediate delivery and is limited to advance orders.2
A manufacturing concern is typically a multiproduct firm, often with
a highly diversified output. Some of its products may be made to stock
and others to order. Some may also shift from one category to the
'This ignores cancellations of orders, which may give risetosome unsold finished stocks,but the
qualification is probably not a major one. The relevant data are scanty, but they indicate that cancel-
lations are relatively unimportant (see the second part of this chapter, beginning with the section
"Comparing Long-Term Average Levels of Orders Received and Filled"); and cancellations that
occur after the items ordered have been produced must be least frequent because of the large risk of
loss, which the seller will try to avoid.
formulate these two models algebraically, letandbethe flows of orders received and
shipped, respectively, during the tth unit period, say month, and letbe the corresponding flow of
output or production. Then ng— U1 — u1_, andz1—= —q,...1 whereisthe
backlog, i.e., stock of unfilled orders, and q, is the finished-product inventory on hand, both
measured at the end of period t.Inpure production to stock, n1=and= 0in each period, so
that UtIS alwayszero. In pure production to order, Z1 andiXq0 in each period, so thatis
always zero.10Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
other at certain times. In particular, a product normally sold from stock
may temporarily be made to order when orders for it run at peak levels
and customers allow lags on their deliveries. But there are good reasons
to believe that some goods are produced to order and others to stock
because of certain "structural" considerations.
Production will not be to stock if the costs of stocking the product
in finished form exceed the costs of having to meet demand exclusively
from future outputs. Under this condition, production will be to order
if it promises to be sufficiently profitable to be undertaken at all. The
costs that must be considered include intangibles that are not easily
assessed in dollars (or any other comparable units). Usually, the com-
parison will take the form of probability considerations involving ex-
pected values of the respective net costs. The principal factor is the
cost of not selling the stocked product or, more accurately, selling it
only at a loss—what might be called a "liquidation loss." If there is
a long delay before the sale can be accomplished, substantial carrying
charges may arise, but these are often not nearly as important as the
liquidation loss. On the other hand, the main cost of not having an
item in stock is the loss of potential sales or customer goodwill when
there is excess demand. This, however, implies that the customer is
not willing to wait for delivery. Clearly, if buyers generally expect
immediate deliveries, the product will have to be held in stock.
It may be well to note that manufacture to order need not be charac-
terized by small total inventories, only by small stocks in finished-
product form. Manufacturers of products made to order will normally
hold inventories of purchased materials, which may include, along
with "raw" commodities, various fabricated items such as standardized
parts, components, and supplies. These stocks help to keep the delivery
periods as short as competition requires (given the existing technologi-
cal constraints). The higher the average degree of fabrication of these
stocks, the better they can perform this function. But, presumably,
with increased fabrication the inventories will also be increasingly
sensitive to the liquidation losses, which, by assumption, are pro-
hibitively large at the finished-product stage, as viewed by the manu-
facturer.3
3Cf. J. A. Bryan, G. P. Wadsworth, and T. M. Whitin, "A Multi-stage Inventory Model," Naval
ResearchLogistic Quarterly, March—June1955 (reprinted in T. M. Whitin,TheTheory of Inven.
toryManagement, 2nded., Princeton, N.J., 1957, pp. 28 1—98).The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 11
Furthermore, the finished product itself will often be held in stock
by the distributor who ordered it from the manufacturer. The distribu-
tor, by assumption of the stock-holding function, will then have en-
abled the manufacturer to produce to order.4
Types of Goods Made to Order
The goods for which manufacturers demand, and their customers
must allow, "lead times" in filling orders are those that can be held in
producer inventory only at very great cost and risk for one or more of
the following reasons: (1) The product must precisely meet individual
consumer specifications that are virtually unpredictable;(2) the
product is, in its finished form, physically or economically perishable,
even though it is made from materials that are durable; (3) the product
has an extremely unstable or sporadic demand, which is very difficult
to forecast.
In the first category belong many diverse goods purchased by expert
buyers for special industrial purposes. The extreme subgroup consists
of items so differentiated by the buyers' requirements that each custo-
mer's order must be handled separately in production; there is no
possible combination of orders into batches that can be executed
jointly by the producer. Thus, many types of machine tools are highly
specialized, with models built to perform a single operation with maxi-
mum speed and efficiency.5
Such uniqueness of orders clearly imposes limitations, which may
be severe, upon the scale of operations and size of a firm. A job ma-
chine shop is an example. But manufacture to order is not by any
means restricted to these individually differentiated orders. A much
larger share of it is accounted for by orders that, while retaining certain
individual features, can nevertheless be aggregated into batches to be
processed and filled together. Thus, many steel and other metal prod-
ucts are made to customers' specifications regarding dimension and
chemical composition. Fabricated plates and sheets are cut to size to
It has often been asserted that it is irrelevant isholding the inventories, and for certain
problemsthis is undoubtedlytrue. However,for other important problems the economic identity of
the inventory holder is very relevant. This will be made clear at several points in this study.
Moreover, competition within this industry largely involves changes in design and quality, the
success of which depends to a great extent upon close cooperation between builder and prospective
user. This industry characteristic should also favor production to order—and it may apply even to
those equipment varieties that have more general uses and are therefore capable of considerable
standardization.12Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
fill specific orders; structural steel is produced in several hundred
different shapes and sizes.6
The second category consists of products that cannot be stored over
longer periods or in larger quantities without losing much of their value
or causing excessive cost or risk. The timing of the production of such
items is not influenced by changes in the raw material supply, because
the material they are made of can be stored (or used for producing other
goods). Products of this kind will be made only to the extent that they
can be promptly shipped to outside users or used by their producers.
Some producer nondurables belong in this category; for example, cer-
tain chemicals (such as explosives) deteriorate with age and/or are dan-
gerous to store.7 But, other than such special producer goods, most of
this class consists of style-sensitive consumer goods. Thus, women's
dresses are rapidly made and shipped to order to the distributors, to
be sold to consumers before the garments go out of fashion. Only in
lines that sell particularly well will a dress manufacturer risk producing
a certain stock against the expected seasonal requirements. In most
lines, he will only prepare samples and perhaps some small stock to
meet the first orders for the coming season. This applies to many other
apparel items, especially in the higher-priced lines.
Goods that are less affected by the vagaries of fashion are also pri-
marily manufactured to order if there are specific requirements of the
buyers that reflect the varying preferences of the individual consumer
in style, color, size, and material. Shoe production, for example, is
mostly on an order basis.8 This then is an overlap of categories 1 and 2.
The third category includes producer durables that are made to or-
der because they are sold to a small number of large companies at in-
frequent intervals and in quantities varying widely according to the
changing business situation in the consuming industry. Railroad equip-
ment, such as rolling stock and rails, offers a classic example. Goods
0Cf.Jack Hirshleifer, "The Firm's Cost Function: A Successful Reconstruction," Journalof
Business,July 1962, PP. 235—55. Hirshleifer uses examples from nonmanufacturing industries
(transportation and electric power) to illustrate production to aggregated rather than individual
orders.
damage in case of accident is, of course, directly related to the size of stock. According to
an early report, business in this industry is predominantly to order and average stocks seldom ex-
ceed seven to ten days' production (dynamite) or a month's supply (black powder). See Edwin G.
Nourse and Associates, Anierica's Capacity to Produce, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution,
1934, p. 290. Commerce data for 1923—3 1 (discontinued later because of small coverage) indicate
an average of about two weeks' output for stocks of all high explosives.
Ruth P. Mack, Consumption and Business Fluctuations: A Case Study of the Shoe, Leather,
Hide Sequence, New York, NBER, 1956, p. 142.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 13
will be produced only upon order if they are characterized both by spo-
radic or unpredictable demand and by the high cost of filling even the
smallest possible order. For example, locomotives or ships cannot be
ordered in less than one unit, and even one such unit is very expensive.
Furthermore, even goods that have none of the characteristics which
would make their production to stock obviously inadvisable —goods
that are staple, low priced, in popular demand, and not perishable—
may be produced to order under conditions of great instability and un-
certainty. After the painful experiences of the 1930's, the textile in-
dustry's concern with the frequent recurrence of both heavy stock ac-
cumulations and drastic production curtailments led to an intensive re-
evaluation of the merits of manufacturing to stock. This was done even
for cotton print cloth, a highly standardized product with a diversified
demand.9 In fact, a number of cotton textile products that are only
slightly differentiated are woven mostly to order. Textile mills operate
in conditions of high short-run instability. Demand for their products
is volatile, with strong seasonal patterns as well as cyclical influences.
More importantly, there are short but sharp speculative ordering move-
ments that chiefly reflect the anticipation by professional textile buyers
of changing prices and shifts in popularity. These fluctuations in buy-
ing are extremely difficult to forecast. The cost of output
is high, but so also is the risk of carrying large unsold stocks.'°
A Criterion for Determining the Prevalent Type of Manufacture
For a good madeonly to stock, unfilled orders (U) are nil." For a
good made only to order, total inventory in finished-product form (Q)
issmall: Unsold finished stocks tend to be nil (see note 1, above), and
See Hiram S. Davis, "Controlling Stocks of Cotton Print Cloth," InventoryPolicies in the Tex-
tile Industries, No.5,Washington,D.C., Textile Foundation, 1941.
'°Towhat extent these conditions are peculiar to the textile industry, I am not prepared to say.
However, it is reported that certain staple materials used in construction (an industry which also
faces very unstable demand) are frequently produced to order. The function of wholesaling them
and maintaining adequate inventories for that purpose is customarily assumed by distributors; so
the manufacturer is largely relieved of the finished-stock burden. Because of this, he sometimes
offers the distributors protection against price rises between the receipt of an order and the time of
shipment, and the benefits of price declines during the same period. For some historical examples,
see Temporary National Economic Committee, GeographicalDifferentials in Prices of Building
Materials, MonographNo. 33, 76th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington, D.C., 1940, pp. 66 and 288.
"Capitalletters denote aggregative variables for individual or major industries, while small let-
ters refer to microvariables (e.g., uisunfilled orders of a given product held by an individual firm;
Uisunfilled orders of an industry or group of firms). The available data pertain as a rule to aggre-
gative variables. The equations in note 2, above, are valid, mutatismutandis (whenexpressed in
common units such as current-dollar or constant-dollar values) for the aggregative variables as well
as the micro ones.14Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
sold stocks would accumulate in large volume only if deliveries lagged
behind output by long intervals, which is unlikely. Certainly, Qwould
in this case be very small relative to U. Industries for which there are
data on both QandU cannot be working to stock only; as a rule, they
include both production to order and production to stock in various
proportions. By comparing the average levels of the QandU series for
these industries, one may determine the relative importance of the two
types of production. The larger the proportion of its output that is made
to order, the closer an industry will come to resemble the model of pure
manufacture to order— and the lower will be its typical Q/Uratio. Con-
versely, the larger the proportion of its output made to stock, the closer
an industry will approach the opposite extreme —andthe higher its typ-
ical Q/U.
Specifically, one must average the monthly values of Q for each com-
plete calendar year covered by the data, then do the same with U;
compute the ratio of these averages (Q/U)foreach year; and judge
from these ratios, expressed as percentages, whether for the given in-
dustry Q/U is typically larger than 100 or smaller than 100 (or whether
it is merely varying around 100 with no systematic preponderance of
either Q or U). If Q typically exceeds U, production to stock is said
to prevail; if Utypicallyexceeds Q,productionto order prevails.
The method must allow for the presence of pronounced cyclical
fluctuations in the stock-backlog ratios. During a vigorous expansion
of demand for its output, an industry is likely to both a fall
in its finished-goods inventory and a rise in its unfilled orders. Con-
versely, contracting demand will be associated with increases in un-
sold stocks and decreases in order backlogs. Hence Q/U should move
inversely to cycles in the given industry's business. Indeed, the ratios
studied show a strong inverted conformity to the business cycle at large.
They tend strongly to increase between a peak and a trough year, and
to decrease between the trough and the subsequent peak year (the
dates being those of the National Bureau annual reference chronology).
Table 2-1 takes account of the cyclical factor in the movement of
the stock-backlog ratios by presenting the averages of these ratios sep-
arately for the expansion (including peak) years and the contraction
(including trough) years. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, unfilled
orders had a strong downward trend in most manufacturing industries,
while finished inventories continued to show a strong upward trend.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 15
Consequently, the Q/U ratios have increased sharply. As a result, the
ratios are high for many years in the "expansion" class, since there
were few contraction years in the postwar period. Nevertheless, the
averages—medians are used to avoid distortion by the unrepresenta-
tive extreme items—are in all but a few cases higher for the contrac-
tion and trough years than for the expansion and peak years (compare
columns 7 and 8). For the individual industry and product series, which
cover the interwar and early postwar years, the differences between the
two categories are typically large.
If the Q/Upercentageratios were higher than 100 in each of the con-
traction and trough years and lower than 100 in each of the expansion
and peak years, I would interpret this to mean that the industry in ques-
tion showed no consistency in working either primarily to order or pri-
marily to stock, but was merely subject to cyclical shifts in which ei-
ther one or the other type of production prevailed. But there is no ex-
ample of such behavior of the ratios in the available data. Instead, the
annual series of the average Q/U ratios, although they all fluctuate
cyclically, group themselves easily into two major categories: those
which in most years —expansionand contraction alike —movesubstan-
tially above the level of 100, and those which move in a parallel fashion
below that level.'2 The former, then, may be regarded as representing
goods typically made to stock and the latter as representing goods typi-
cally made to order. In the individual-product sample of Table 2-1, the
two groups are about equal in number. The inclusion of peak years in
the measures for expansion and of trough years in the measures for
contraction could bias the results, since the averages of the ratios in
expansion years other than the peak year and of the ratios in contrac-
tion years other than the trough year need not necessarily show the in-
verse cyclical conformity that is generally indicated in Table 2-1. (This
has been pointed out to me by Geoffrey Moore.) Separate averages
were therefore computed forfour subsets of data: expansion, peak, con-
traction, and trough years. With very few exceptions, the median Q/U
ratios turned out to be larger for the contraction than for the expansion
years as well as larger for the trough than for the peak years. The ex-
ceptions are slight: They relate either to cases in which only one or two
observations are available for the subsets to be compared (mainly the
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Notes to Table 2-1
Source: Steel barrels and oak flooring (1947—64): U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census; wire cloth: Wire Cloth Manufacturers' Association; illuminating
glassware: Illuminating Glassware Guild; face brick: American Face Brick Association;
total hardwoods: Hardwoods Manufacturers' Institute; western pine lumber: Maple
Flooring Manufacturers' Association; textiles, except series on staple rayon, cotton
yarn, worsted yarn, and broadwoven goods: Hiram S. Davis, "Inventory Trends in
Textile Production and Distribution," Number Seven of Inventory Policies in the Tex-
tileindustries, The Textile Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 27; textile
products not in preceding source and primary metals: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Business Economics. For sources underlying the remaining items see Appen-
dix A.
a(ST)signifies goods made primarily to stock; (OR), goods made primarily to order.
bIdentifiesthe complete calendar years for which the average ratios of finished stocks
to unfilled orders were computed.
Identified according to the annual reference chronology of the National Bureau. For
the calendar-year dates of business cycle peaks and troughs in the United States see
A F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1947,
Table 16, p. 78.
dQ/Udenotes ratio of finished-goods inventory to unfilled orders (U), in per-
centage terms. The ratios are based on monthly averages of Q and U for each calendar
year covered.
eTheevidence of the ratios is inadequate for classifying this item as either "to order"
or "to stock," due to the shortness of the record and the apparently dominant influence
of the cyclical factor in the movement of the ratios above and below 100.
The product is described in monographs on management policies in the textile in-
dustries as being sold from current as well as future output. See text and note 14.
gForeach of the industries except paper products, two sets of measures are shown,
one based on the OBE data for the years before 1956 and the other based on the current
Census data (1963 revision) that cover the later years as well.
contraction years) or to small and uncertain differences (which are in
several instances reversed when means instead of medians are used).
For the aggregate series which start in 1946 or 1948, the category
"contraction years" (excluding trough years) is empty, because none
of the recent business declines lasted more than thirteen months. In no
case did the re-examination of the ratios lead to a revision of the clas-
sification in Table 2-1 ,column 9, which distinguishes the products made
primarily to order from those made primarily to stock.
Interindustry Comparisons of Stock-Backlog Ratios
Some of the products covered in Table 2-1 would be expected to be
manufactured primarily to order and some primarily to stock. On the
whole, the results obtained by using the Q/U ratios conform to such20Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
expectations. For example, the ratios are low in both good and bad
business years for steel sheets, which we know are made largely to
specification. The ratios are extremely low throughout for steel barrels
and drums, a heavy item of industrial equipment. They run with per-
fect or high consistency below the level of 100 for those textile prod-
ucts which are style-sensitive or must meet individual buyer require-
ments: woolen menswear fabrics, colored yarn shirtings, and cotton
and worsted yarns. Ontheother hand, the ratios are typically high
(greater than 100) for a variety of staple products: textiles such as ho-
siery and sheets; construction materials such as southern pine lumber
and face brick; and residential building equipment such as oil burners
and bathroom fixtures.'3
However, it must be noted that the dichotomy employed, while em-
phasizing one important distinction between types of business opera-
tion in manufacturing, glosses over another, no less important distinc-
tion between modes of adjustment to varying demand. A firm should
be able to avoid building a large finished inventory even though it pro-
duces goods without having sold them previously on contract. The ad-
justment of output and price, if sufficiently prompt and large, should
minimize the volume of both finished stocks and unfilled orders. (In-
deed, the extreme model of perfect competition without uncertainty
can be conceived, in which instantaneous market price reactions would
prevent the appearance of stocks and backlogs alike.) Although
these output and price variations perform a major role in adjustment to
business fluctuations, in practice (for reasons to be explored later) they
still leave room, in many diverse industries, for product inventories
and order backlogs whose average volumes and changes are large.
Where the average levels of both product inventories and order back-
logs (QandU)aresmall relative to average output (Z)orshipments
(s),onewould assume that the firms rely largely on price-output ad-
justments and succeed in selling their outputs currently. The compari-
son of the ratiosalone does not permit isolation of the elements
of the "sell-as-you-make" policy from those of the "sell-before-" and
"sell-after-you-make" policies.'4 However, from the available data it
A unique case is presented by maple flooring,where the stock-backlogratios show a strong
decline between the prewar and the recent postwar period. Here the averages for 929—54 all ex-
ceed 100, while those for 1947—64 are less than 100; so a reclassification from ST to OR is required
under our criterion.
" Note that if output is sold shortly before it comes off the machine, some backlog of orders willThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 21
appears that where U is large relative toitis also typically large
relative towhichtends to validate the notion of manufacture to or-
der described here and the selection of the industries that are repre-
sentative of this category.
The one significant exception to this among the major industries that
report unfilled orders is paper. In this industry finished inventory tends
to be smaller than the unfilled orders backlog (see the industry aggre-
gate and compare also "boxboards" and "paper, excl. building pa-
per ..." inthe product section of Table 2-1) but the backlog itself is
very small —onthe average not more than about two-thirds of monthly
shipments. (Of all major manufacturing industries for which unfilled
orders are reported, paper alone has a U/S ratio of less than I, as shown
in Table 6-5, below.) Hence current price and output adjustments
would be expected to be very important in the paper industry, and they
are, particularly output adaptability.15
When the figures for finished stocks and unfilled orders are not
physical-volume data for individual commodities but value data for
multiproduct industries, the ratios must be viewed in the light of the
probability that QandU represent aggregates of different goods. A
predominance of QoverU could then mean that most of the items pro-
duced by the given industry are made typically to stock, but it could
also mean that the items made to stock, even though less numerous
than the others, have a larger value weight.16 Nevertheless, there is
little ambiguity about the evidence in Table 2-1, which clearly confirms
that production to order prevails heavily in such industry groups as
existat any time, thoughit cannot belarger than the amount of work started in production (assuming
that no real "advance" orders,i.e., commitments of output of futureproductionperiods,are ac-
cepted). Finished stocks do notcomeinto existence, and yet the product is made in anticipation of
immediate needs of the market, not in fulfillment of contracts for delivery in the more distant future.
It follows that unfilled orders may exceed finished stocks for an industry whose principal policy is
"make and sell" rather than "make to order."
relationship between new orders, production, and shipments of paper is close, and the lags
involved are mostly short (see Chapter 4). Information from the American Paper and Pulp Associa-
tion confirms that, while paper products are produced in large measure to order in accordance with
the evidence of our QIU ratios, the lags of output and shipments relative to new orders are usually
very short. The reasons given are the continuous nature and fairly short duration of fabrication
processes and the great adaptability of equipment to production of various items. But prices, too,
seem to be more flexible here than in many other manufacturing industries (see Chapter 6).
The pattern of rayon taffetas is similar. Judging from the slender information on the Q/U ratios
that is here available, this product would be classified as manufactured to order, but the prewar Tex-
tile Foundation study (see source note to Table 2-I)refersto this case as exemplifying a policy of
selling from current output.
16 ratios for textile products show how heterogeneous the output of a major industry can be
when it is classified according to whether the goods are made to order or to stock (Table 2-I, listings
for individual products of the industry).22Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
primary metals, machinery, and transportation equipment, as would be
expected.'7
Furthermore, the ratios for the comprehensive major-industry ag-
gregates show that industries which produce mainly to order are domi-
nant in the composite of all durable manufactures. In contrast, produc-
tion to stock apparently prevails within the aggregate of nondurable
goods industries. In appraising this last finding, however, one must
remember that all of the major nondurable goods industries report
inventory figures, while only four of them—textiles, leather, paper, and
printing and publishing —reportunfilled orders. For the large part of the
nondurables sector that includes food, beverages, apparel, tobacco,
chemicals, petroleum, and rubber, new orders are considered to be
equal to "sales" (or value of shipments) in the current compilation of
the Department of Commerce. For most of the products of these in-
dustries the assumption that orders backlogs are negligible should be
realistic. (Note that these are, in part, products of industries in which
continuity of operation is particularly important for cost reasons; in
part, goods whose rates of supply in the short period are subject to
only a very limited control by the manufacturer; and, in part, com-
modities whose producers face fairly stable and predictable demand
conditions.) However, some of the component industries of these
major groups undoubtedly do receive advance orders which may at
times accumulate to substantial volumes.18
Finally, for total manufacturing (last two lines of Table 2-1), the
ratios again suggest that sectors working to order outweigh those work-
ing to stock, despite the inclusion here of the seven major nondurable
goods industries "without unfilled orders." No doubt, the ratios can
points made in this and the following paragraphs are demonstrated in Table 2-I with the aid
of both the most recent series on manufacturers' orders and inventories (as revised in 1963; see
Table 2-1, note g) and the data before 1953.
18Backlogsof purchasing orders from distributors and retailers are certainly no: negligible in at
least a large part of the apparel industry, which is characterized by small companies that are prob-
ably particularly anxious to keep finished inventory low because of the risks inherent in the seasonal-
ity and sensitivity to style changes of their operations. In fact, the National Credit Office, Inc., has
collected quarterly information on Unit production, shipments, stocks of piece goods, andunfilled
orders froma panel of more than one hundred clothing manufacturers for a few recent years. In the
seven quarters between the fall 1950 season and the spring 1952 season, unfilled orders of menswear
manufacturers amounted most often to about one-half and sometimes to more than three-fourths of
the manufacturers' cuttings (see W. A. Bennett and R. S. White, "Menswear, Past, Present, and
Future," Dun'sReview, August1952, pp. 29 and 60—66). It may be, however, that the unfilled orders
for lines of apparel still more "perishable" from the point of view of the seller (such as women's
dresses) would be much smaller because rates of output and deliveries are adjusted with particular
rapidity to swings in new business for such articles.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 23
give only a crude indication of how total manufacturing is divided be-
tween industries operating to order and industries operating to stock.
But as far as this evidence goes, it is unequivocal in pointing to (1) a
sharp contrast between the order-oriented durables and the stock-
oriented nondurables, and (2) the strikingly high importance of sectors
producing to order within the manufacturing division as a whole.19
It must be admitted that the period covered by the aggregate data
(193 9—64) mostly includes years of good or excellent business condi-
tions: the rapid wartime expansion and the generally prosperous post-
war times. But even in 1939, which was quite a poor year, finished
stocks amounted to no more than 88 per cent of unfilled orders for all
manufactures (48 per cent for total durables and 229 per cent for total
nondurables).
None of these results should be understood to imply that any neat
divisions can be made within industry aggregates between production
to stock and production to order. Diversified outputs of large com-
panies would often include both categories in variable proportions.
Dependable quantitative information on this subject is scanty or non-
existent, and presumably hard to acquire; the indirect and rough meas-
ures presented here must not be viewed as compensating for the de-
ficiencies in the data. Nevertheless, the evidence from the ratios
has claims to both reasonableness and usefulness. It is consistent not
only with what is known in general about the industries under study
but also with differences in relative timing and amplitudes that are ob-
served for series classified according to type of manufacture (see Chap-
ters 3 and 4, passim). Further evidence bearing on the importance of
unfilled orders (and therefore of production to order) in industries
covered by the new Census data on manufacturers' shipments and
orders (1963 revision) is given in Appendix A (Table A-2 and text).
'°Onthe logic of our test, i.e., assuming that the stock-backlog ratios tend to be considerably
higher (lower) than 100 for all goods made typically to stock (to order), the range of the ratios for
total manufacturing (from 23 to 36) in Table 2-I would indicate that the greater part of industrial pro-
duction is organized on an order, and not on a stock, basis. If the contrary situation were true and
production to stock were prevalent, then the average level of Q/ U would have to exceed 50. For even
if the average for all sectors working to stock were as low as 100 and that for all sectors working to
order as low as zero, the over-all ratio could not be lower than 50 as long as production to stock ac-
counted for not less than half of total manufacturing output (it would equal 50 if it accounted for pre-
cisely half of the total). But we expect the average for the stock-oriented industries to be substantially
above 100 and the average for the order-oriented industries to be higher than zero (but significantly
lower than 100). This makes it even more certain that an over-all average ratio considerably lower
than 50 still indicates the prevalence of production to order.24Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Interpreting Orders Data:
The Importance of Cancellations
Loose Intentions or Firm Commitments?
Much of the preceding analysis implicitly assumes that orders re-
ceived by manufacturers represent declarations of serious decisions,
rather than indications of loose intentions, to buy. A company would
hardly be able or willing to engage in production to order, unless it
viewed the bulk of its orders as "firm" in this sense. The test is, of
course, actual experience: When the proportion of cancellations is
steadily high, orders cannot long be regarded as firm commitments.
The legal contractual arrangements and industrial customs regarding
orders generally reflect the economic considerations that are decisive
for the issue; but the economic factors are likely to vary, perhaps not
just between industries but also over time, while laws and customs are
relatively rigid.
Where production is largely to stock but some advance orders are
being received, the usefulness to the company of such orders as pre-
dictors of demand should depend on their firmness (as well as their
size relative to the total company output). Interesting questions arise
here of how advance orders are used in this role and what predictive
value they possess, but the available aggregative data, in which ad-
vance orders are mixed with orders filled from stock, are clearly not
designed to help in examining such questions.
Information of two kinds can be used to appraise the role of order
cancellations: reports on trade practices and the evidence of time series.
Unfortunately, both sources are meager. The quantitative evidence of
time series is by far the more important of the two, and it will permit us
to draw some guarded inferences.
First, however, let us refer to some reports on the terms of sale con-
tracts in individual industries. These suggest that establishing and vary-
ing the rules on cancellation privileges is one of the instruments by
which sellers can influence the course of ordering. But such privileges
are often negotiated between the firm placing and the firm receiving
the order, and are thus determined by the buyer as well as the seller.
Sales agreements differ substantially in regard to the interrelated
clauses on cancellations, acceptances, and deliveries. Consider theThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 25
followingillustrations of the diverse rules accepted by companies in
different industries. In the early post-World War II period (a time when
"seller's markets" predominated), cancellations were (1) precluded
altogether on ordered goods in process of manufacture or on special
sizes, shapes, etc. (rayon, steel, and structural clay and pottery prod-
ucts); (2) allowed, provided the buyer answered for the possible losses
to the seller (paper); (3) permitted, along with changes of orders, in
cases of mutual consent only (foundry equipment); and (4) acknowl-
edged as a privilege of the producer in the event of his inability to se-
cure the necessary materials and parts (electrical supplies and appli-
ances). Purchase contracts featuring an "escalator clause," providing
for an increase in sale price in the case of a rise in the costs of the
seller, were frequent in many industries, but in some (e.g., chemicals)
they also reserved to the buyer the right not to accept the shipment if
he deemed the price increase excessive or otherwise unwarranted.2°
This differentiation occurs partly because customary trade practices
vary among industries, and partly because of other factors, such as
changing business and market conditions, new legal decisions, mutual
confidence of buyer and vendor, etc. Systematic and substantial in-
terindustry differences in cancellation privileges reduce the usefulness
of the order series for individual industries as general business indi-
cators.2'
Comparing Long-Term Average Levels of
Orders Received and Filled
In most of the series based on directly reported new-order figures,
orders canceled during the reporting period have not been deducted.
Take a series on gross new orders for a given industry or product and
a corresponding series on output or shipments. Assuming the two are
strictly comparable in coverage, the average level of the new orders
over a long period of time should exceed the average level of the ship-
ments only by the average amount of cancellations (orders include both
the advance orders and orders filled or shipped directly from stock).
This is the rationale of the simple procedure followed in Table 2-2.
See G. Clark Thompson, "Industry's Terms and Conditions of Sale," National Industrial Con-
ference Board, Studiesin Business Policy, ConferenceBoard Report 26, New York, 1948, passim;
and F. R. Lusardi, "Purchasing for Industry," in ibid.,Report33, New York, 1948, P. 22.
21Cf."An Appraisal of Data and Research on Businessmen's Expectations About Outlook and
Operating Variables," Reportof Consultant Committee on General Business Expectations Organ-
ized by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September1955, p. 133.26Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Table 2-2
Comparison of Average Annual Levels of Gross New
Orders, Shipments, and Production, Selected Indus-



















MACHINE TOOLS, DOMESTIC (MILL. DOE.), (18)
Orders d= 467
Shipments +44 9.4
MACHINE TOOLS, FOREIGN (MILL. DOL.), 1946._63c (18)
Ordersd =80
Shipments +6 7.4
WOODWORKING MACHINERY (THous. DOL.), 1921_39c (19)
Ordersd =10,697
Shipments +91 0.9




RAILROAD FREIGHT CARS (NO. OF CARS), 1913_55C (43)
=69,561
Shipments +2,877 4.1
RAILROAD PASSENGER CARS (No. OF CARS), 1911_55c (45)
1,048
Shipments —16 (1.5)
RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVES (No. OF LOCOMOTIVES), l920_40c (21)
Orders d= 698
Shipments +2 0.3












FURNITURE (NO. OF DAYS PROD.), I924_46C (23)
Ordersd =259
Shipments +34 13.1
BOXBOARD (THous. SHORT TONS), l924_32c (9)
Ordersd =2,512
Production —13 (0.5)
PAPERBOARD(Tuous. SHORT TONS), 1938_55c (18)
Orders d= 9,254
Production +111 1.2













BATHTUBS(THous. PIECES), l918_26c (9)
=901
Shipments +77 8.5
LAVATORIES(THous. PIECES), 1918—31 C(14)
Orders" =1,047
Shipments +59 5.6
KITCHEN SINKS (THous. PIECES), 19l8_31C (14)
Orders"= 1,102
Shipments +62 5.628Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Notes to Table 2-2
Source: See Appendix A.
The unitsare thoseindicated for the individual industry. The averages are based on
annual totals of the series for new orders, shipments, and production for each calendar
year over the period covered by that industry.
bRatioof the amount shown in column Ito the amount of orders of the industry, multi-
plied by 100. The percentages that correspond to the negative values in column 1 are
shown in parentheses. Because of rounding, the figures may differ from those computed
by calculating the ratios from the levels and differences shown in the table.
Identifies the complete calendar years covered by the corresponding series for gross
new orders and shipments or production. The number of years is given in parentheses.
new orders, average annual level.
In this table, average annual amounts of gross new orders are pre-
sented for eighteen industries or product groups in column 4; in each
case, the figure is the mean of annual totals for all the complete cal-
endar years covered by the given series (the periods and units used are
identified in columns 2 and 3). Similarly, mean annual levels relating to
the same periods were calculated in the same units for shipments and,
where data permitted, also for outputs of the same industries. Alge-
braic differences computed by subtracting the mean levels of shipments
or production from the mean levels of gross new orders are listed in
column 5 and are shown as a percentage of the levels of orders in
column 6. There are sixteen comparisons with shipments (including
two for machine tools, where separate figures are available for domestic
and foreign transactions) and seven with production.
The expected sign of the differences in column 5 is a plus (indicating
positive cancellations), but in eight of the twenty-three cases the dif-
ferences are negative. This presumably means that the coverage of the
order series is less than that of shipments or production; so the com-
parisons in these cases are inconclusive. However, in percentage terms
these differences are quite small for each case but merchant pig iron.
Where the differences are positive, most of them are again small; sev-
eral amount to less than 1 per cent of the average level of gross new
orders (column 6). The figures that suggest very low typical cancella-
tion amounts are found for heavy equipment such as railroad locomo-
tives, but also for diverse investment goods and materials (woodwork-
ing machinery, steel sheets), and even some standardized items (paper
and paperboard, southern pine lumber). On the other hand, in a few
instances the excess of gross orders over shipments is relatively large,The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 29
notably so for furniture (13 per cent), machine tools (7—9 per cent),
and the three items of sanitary ware (6—9 per cent).
Separate data on cancellations are available for machine tools, wood-
working machinery, and furniture. Expressing cancellations as a per-
centage of gross new orders in terms of the average annual levels, the
following figures are obtained: for domestic machine tools, 8.8; foreign
machine tools, 6.4; woodworking machinery, 2.6; and furniture, 8.1.
These percentages are lower than the corresponding entries in Table
2-2, column 6, except for woodworking machinery, but the discrep-
ancies are not disturbingly large.22 The figures computed directly from
the cancellation data are presumably the more accurate estimates.
As will be shown presently, cancellations fluctuate greatly over time;
in some periods, they are much larger and more important than the
averages of Table 2-2 indicate. Undoubtedly, duplications of orders in
times of rapid increases of demand and cancellations of orders in times
of large decreases of demand combine to exert a disturbing influence in
some of the individual industries to which the data refer.23 On the
average, however, cancellations appear to be relatively small for a
large variety of products, including most items produced to order, such
as locomotives and (according to industry reports) fabricated structural
steel.
In general, one would expect sales contracts to be less easily rev-
ocable for the larger order-unit and high-cost goods than for smaller
and less expensive items; also, less for specialized than for standard-
ized, general-purpose products. The one case that would seem to con-
tradict this expectation is machine tools, which are highly specialized
but show a relatively high incidence of cancellations. However, this is
mostly due to the large rise in cancellations during 1950—5 3 (see the
next section), when military and defense-related contracts became very
important for many durable goods industries, including machine tools.
22 largest discrepancyis for the furniture series,which is perhapsassociated with the particu-
lar measurement units used for this item. According to the source of these data (the public accounting
firm of Seidman and Seidman, Grand Rapids, Michigan), because of the variation in the number of
firms reporting each month, the figures are "shown in number of days' production or sales, based on
current ratios.... Theoriginal data are based on value" (see Surveyof Current Business, Annual
Supplement, 1932,p.297).
according to the Enameled Sanitary Ware Manufacturers' Association, "orders shipped
are the best current index of the industry. Orders received are likely to pyramid during periods of
great activity to be followed by cancellations if the demand drops off" (Surveyof Current Business,
May1922, p. 81). See last three lines of Table 2-2 for figures on the average level and proportion of
cancellations for these products.30Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Such contracts have special characteristics because they originate in
the largest single source of buying power, the defense system of the
federal government, and reflect certain centralized decisions based
largely on noneconomic considerations. The latter may cause heavy
bunching of military and related orders at certain times (during a war
crisis) and sharp curtailments or withdrawals at others (when hostilities
decrease and peace prospects improve).24
In an early (c. 1936) unpublished study of building construction,
Arthur F. Burns expressed the presumption that cancellations of con-
struction contracts are much less important than cancellations of orders
for most commodities. Data to test this hypothesis are not available,
but the preceding argument supports it strongly. A decision to build
and equip a new industrial plant, for example, represents a commit-
ment over a long span of the future that typically involves far greater
costs and risks than a decision to alter the rate of production of a plant
already in existence.
Gross and Net Orders
Unlike all other series of new orders in our collection, which are
compiled directly from company data for this variable, the aggregative
value series of the Department of Commerce are derived indirectly.
The reporting unit is here, as in nearly all other compilations of orders
data, the firm that has received the orders. The method consists in add-
ing to the estimates of manufacturers' sales (recorded at the time of
shipment) the corresponding figures on changes in the backlog of un-
filled orders. This procedure results in estimates of new orders net of
cancellations.25
Apart from such major episodic factors, defense orders, in their short-term movements, are likely
to be quite sensitive to a host of minor random influences. The average unit size of these orders will
presumably be large and the average number of orders per unit of time will be small if the unit is short
(a month or a quarter), e.g., military contracts for aircraft and ships. Orders with these characteristics
would be expected to show large irregular short-period fluctuations—to be heavily bunched in one
period and very sparse in another. (See Chapter 4 on aircraft orders and aggregate defense obliga-
tions.)
the sum of sales and the change in unfilled orders gives netneworders follows from two
definitional propositions: (1) the value of all orders accepted but not filled or canceled equals the
change in backlogs over the period; and (2) sales measure the value of orders filled. Let N2' denote
the value of gross new orders accepted; D1, orders filled (delivered); andcancellations in period
t; andhave been defined before. Then we have
Adding the foregoing gives+ —But we already know that= + S1; thus
equals —(i.e., it is net of cancellations).The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 31
The Commerce estimation method also implies that the cancella-
tions that occur in the current month (t) are reflected in the current
estimate of net new orders (Ne). But it is the orders received in past
months that probably account for a considerable part of current can-
cellations; the orders just received seem least likely to be canceled. A
systematic variation over time in the age or vintage of canceled orders,
if it exists, would be an interesting phenomenon that should be taken
into account in appraising the impact of new orders on production,
shipments, etc. To illustrate, suppose that cancellations are high at
about the time of the downturn and shortly thereafter, and that they
refer to "old" orders placed in mid-expansion or the early boom. Then
new orders recorded in that phase of the business upswing will have
been overstated, in the sense that lower estimates would have led to
better (less optimistically biased) predictions of future shipments (i.e.,
of the values of S at the assumed downturn phase). Unfortunately, in-
formation about the composition by vintage of the canceled orders is
not available. Data on unfilled orders are not decomposed that way
either; if they were, many interesting problems in the analysis of short-
run behavior of orders and production, including this one, could be
treated much more effectively.
Independent evidence on the behavior of manufacturers' orders since
1949 is provided by series compiled by Standard and Poor's Corpora-
tion. These are monthly indexes (1949 =100)based on dollar values.
They have a much smaller sample base than the Commerce series;
hence they are considerably more erratic. The indexes for new orders
are compiled directly, gross of cancellations.26
Chart 2-1 compares the Commerce value aggregate for all industries
reporting new orders as distinct from shipments, with Standard and
Poor's composite index. (Excluded in both cases is a large part of the
nondurable goods sector for which the value of new orders is assumed
to equal the value of shipments.) The two series are plotted to uniform
logarithmic scales, a standard procedure in most of the charts in this
book. [On these scales, vertical distances denote equal relative changes,
permitting direct comparisons between all kinds of (nonnegative) data.]
26Becauseof theirnarrowcoverage, the component-industry indexes from the Standard and Poor's
compilation are used in this book largely as supplementary evidence. However, in Appendix B, the
charted behavior and cyclical timing measures of the indexes for shipments, unfilled orders, and new
orders are discussed at some length. The indexes are presented there for 1949—58, for which they
have been seasonally adjusted by the National Bureau.32Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Chart 2-1
Department of Commerce and Standard and Poor's Estimates of
Total Advance Orders for Durable and Nondurable Goods, 1949—58
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Note:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
aIncludesall durable goods industries and four major nondurable goods industries
reporting unfilled orders.
The periods of general business contraction are shaded, another ar-
rangement followed in most of these charts. It is clear that the two
series have very similar systematic movements —trendsand cyclical
fluctuations. Both their timing and their relative amplitudes are much
alike.
The one significant difference is in 1952. There the Commerce series
shows an upward movement which, while mild, is yet sufficiently long
and clear to qualify as a specific-cycle expansion. In Standard and
Poor's index, on the other hand, the corresponding movements are con-
siderably shorter and weaker: a retardation superimposed upon the
contraction that began early in 1951, rather than a cyclical expansion.
The reason for this is not easily determined, since the two samples
differ greatly in size and to some extent also in composition, but an
important part of the explanation is probably the contrast between a
net and a gross orders series. In some durable goods industries, es-
pecially those with heavy military contracts, cancellations increasedThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 33
very substantially when the threat of a further intensification or an ex-
tension of the Korean conflict subsided and the chances of a truce in-
creased. Thus net orders (Commerce) dropped much more rapidly than
gross orders (Standard and Poor's) from their Korean peak levels. The
increase in cancellations was temporary. When cancellations returned
to their substantially lower normal levels, net orders moved upward,
again closely approaching the value of gross orders, which may have
been declining all along, or perhaps were just leveling off temporarily
(Chart 2-1).
The coverage of the component industries in the Standard and Poor's
compilation is too narrow to allow detailed comparisons with the Com-
merce series for the corresponding industries.27 However, for one
major industry, nonelectrical machinery, an independent survey of
new orders is conducted by the economics department of the McGraw-
Hill Publishing Company, and these data have some interesting features
not available elsewhere. Like the Standard and Poor's series, they are
indexes based on dollar values of new orders, gross of cancellations,
beginning in 1949. But they are designed to concentrate on that part of
nonelectrical machinery output which represents industrial equipment
serving the needs of private nonagricultural producers. An effort is
thus made to exclude from these indexes orders for defense products,
consumer durables (household appliances), and farm machinery. The
resulting totals cover seven types of machinery and, since 1957, are
also divided into domestic and foreign orders.28
Despite the differences in the coverage and estimation methods,
there is a substantial similarity between the McGraw-Hill index and
the Commerce series on the aggregate value of new orders for total
nonelectrical machinery (Chart 2-2). Again, this applies to the longer
systematic movements, i.e., to the trends and cycles. The short ir-
regular movements are usually more frequent, if not longer, in the index
than in the aggregate, but at times (e.g., in 1951) the opposite is true.
There are probably opposite factors at work here: the smaller sample
Some further observations on this point are made in Appendix B.
seven components are pumps and compressors, engines and turbines, construction ma-
chinery, mining machinery, metalworking machinery, office equipment, and other industrial ma-
chinery. Indexes are available for all these categories (since 1957, for foreign as well as total new or-
ders). The data are published without seasonal adjustment, except for total new orders, for which
the adjusted figures are also given. The base period was 1950 until March 1963, when it was replaced
by the average 1957—59 =100.New seasonal adjustment factors were also introduced at that time
(see release of the McGraw-Hill Department of Economics, March 4, 1963, Part 111).34Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Chart 2-2
Department of Commerce and McGraw-Hill Estimates of
New Orders for Nonelectrical Machinery, 1949—62
BlilLons of dollars Index
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, short cycles or retarda-
tions.
tends to make the index more erratic, while the deduction of cancella-
tions tends to add to the variability of the Commerce series.
The kind of difference between the course of the net and gross orders
in 1952 that was observed for the comprehensive series in Chart 2-1 is
not produced here, except perhaps faintly (see Chart 2-2). This may be
related to the exclusion of military orders from the McGraw-Hill
series. The other differences between the two nonelectrical machinery
estimates which appear significant (in 1956 and 1959—60) may also
reflect the discrepancies in coverage more than the effects of cancella-
tions.
The role of cancellations can be isolated from other factors in the
machine tool industry, for which data relating to orders are particularly
rich. Chart 2-3 compares domestic net new orders for machine tools
with the corresponding gross orders. The two monthly series stay close
together most of the time but move apart in certain periods, particu-
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flict illustrates strikingly the developments discussed before in connec-
tion with Chart 2-1.
The timing of the two series at peaks is nearly identical, but at troughs
there are some differences. These suggest that net orders would at
times turn upward earlier than gross orders (see Chart 2-3 for the years
1956 and 1958). It will be shown presently that cancellations tend to
lag behind orders received; they were declining sharply during most of
1954 and again in 1958, which explains the net-gross discrepancies
observed at these troughs.
Cancellations
Orders for industrial products can be canceled for a number of
reasons: (1) a change of mind by the would-be purchaser (he no longer
wants his order filled because of actual or expected changes in business
conditions or revised calculations: the costs of completing the trans-
action appear greater than the costs of withdrawing); (2) an analogous
change by the prospective supplier or vendor; (3) nonfulfillment of
contract, or unsatisfactory performance, or disagreement on how the
order was to be or was executed (this may be by either party to the
transaction or third parties such as subcontractors); (4) liquidation of
"surplus" orders by the firm that had placed them (these are tentative,
informal orders implying no binding commitment; multiple orders of
this kind may be placed at certain times, particularly when a tight sup-
ply situation is suspected, to insure timely delivery; after the required
items are received, the remaining "duplicating" orders are rescinded).
If cancellations have a "normal" range and rise well above it, would
not such an increase be a sign of economic distress, like a similar move-
ment in business failures, for example? An affirmative answer implies
that the rise in cancellations can be accounted for primarily by the first
two causes, i.e., a deterioration in business conditions or expectations
that forced the withdrawal of a great many orders placed at a time when
business was better or was expected to improve.
To the extent that they are thus motivated, increases in cancellations
should occur mainly during business recessions, perhaps with a short
lead where the worsening of conditions was anticipated. This would
imply a tendency toward inverted cyclical behavior. In the data on
cancellations, however, positive cyclical patterns prevail, modified
somewhat by lags and secondary movements. Thus the postwar seriesThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 37
for machine tools shows three troughs which follow the business cycle
revivals in 1949, 1954, and 1958byshort intervals (see the upper
curve in Chart 2-4). It also shows three peaks, a high one early in 1952
(the advanced stage of the "Korean" expansion), and lower ones in
1956—57andlate 1960, again at the close of an upswing or shortly
afterward.
A comparison of Charts 2-4 and 2-3 indicates a substantial positive
correlation between cancellations and new orders, with cancellations
lagging behind new orders. At peaks, cancellations lagged gross new
orders by long intervals, at troughs by intermediate or short intervals,
as shown in the accompanying table.
Lead (—)or Lead (—)or
Date of Lag (+) of Date of Lag (+) of
Peakin Cancellations Trough in Cancellations
GrossOrders (mos.) Gross Orders (mos.)
Aug. 1949 +6
Feb. 1951 +12 July 1954 +3
Dec. 1955 Aug.1958 +1
July 1959 +14
Average +14.7 Average +3.3
aCancellationshad a double-peak configuration in 1956—57 (see Chart 2-4).
This comparison is based on the second, higher peak; had the first one been
used, a lag of five months and an average of 10.3 months would have re-
sulted.
The positive association between new orders and cancellations can
be explained very simply by the assumption that a certain proportion of
orders received will usually be canceled. Given that probability, it is
clear that a rise in new orders, which usually results also in a rise in
order backlogs, would lead to an increase in cancellations. When there
is a larger number of orders on the manufacturers' books, the number of
cancellations that fall into the third category above is likely to be greater,
too. A large influx of orders during a buying boom may also involve a
certain amount of multiple orders (as in category 4) that are subse-
quently liquidated. In short, cancellations of all types are likely to in-
crease (decrease) in response to expansions (contractions) in the








































































































































































































































































































































































































.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 39
The argument seems to apply primarily to the number of orders
rather than their aggregative value. One would not necessarily expect
cancellations to rise if a rise in total value of orders reflected an in-
crease in the average order size, rather than the number of orders out-
standing. There is, after all, no presumption that the probability of can-
cellation is greater for large orders than for small ones. The available
data measure the value or physical volume, not the number, of orders;
consequently, these propositions cannot be tested directly. But the
distinction between numbers and values is probably not very important
in practice, since there is presumably a strong correlation between the
two, especially for the large systematic movements in orders, which
are here of main interest.
However, to explain that cancellations vary in a positive correlation
with the volume of orders because they form a stable proportion of that
volume is a gross oversimplification of what actually happens. The sec-
ond curve in Chart 2-4 shows that the ratio of cancellations to gross
new orders undergoes fluctuations similar to those of the cancellations
themselves.29 In other words, when incoming business and backlogs
expand, cancellations increase not only absolutely but also relative to
orders received. Furthermore, the timing discrepancies between can-
cellations and orders must be considered as a factor modifying the
basic positive association of these two variables. Cancellations lag
considerably; so, their peaks occur when new business is already
sharply falling and their troughs when it is already sharply rising (com-
pare Charts 2-4 and 2-3). Here, then, is an element of inverse relation-
ship between cancellations and a particular indicator of business condi-
tions, namely, the rate of change (not the level) of new orders.3°
Data for woodworking machinery extending over the interwar pe-
riod confirm that new orders and cancellations are positively correlated
(Chart 2-5).Cancellationsare here again small and highly erratic; their
major movements are distinct in the original data but somewhat
blurred by the short irregular variations; therefore, it might be useful
Relative movements in cancellations are larger than those in new orders and dominate the
changes in the ratio. The ratio lags somewhat behind cancellations partly because it is based on
smoothed series (unsmoothed, it is extremely erratic). Gross new orders were used in the denomi-
nator but similar results would have been obtained with unfilled orders (judging from the behavior of
total backlogs of machine tool orders, since separate backlog figures for domestic orders are not
available).
3°Thechange in new orders, which often turns ahead of the level, is of course a very early indi-
cator. But the inverse relation in question is clearly meaningful and not just a reflection of timing di-




































































































































































































.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 41
to visualize this series in smoothed form. The large swings during the
1930's—down in 1929—33, up in 1933—37—stand out in both new or-
ders and cancellations, but smaller movements in the two series at
other times are also correlated. Lags of cancellations prevail at peaks,
but there are more leads at troughs, and the timing dispersion is con-
siderable.31
Finally, there is also some supporting evidence for furniture orders in
the period 1923—29, though these data must be interpreted with cau-
tion (see note 22, above). Here new orders measured in value of pro-
duction per day reached their highest levels in 1926, as did cancella-
tions measured as percentage of new orders. In 1928—29, new orders
had average monthly values equal to those of production (about 28
production days' worth); by 1934, they had declined to the equivalent
of eight days. Cancellations dropped in the same period from 12 to 7
per cent of new orders. However, cancellations remained very low,
with some tendency to decline, in 1934—36 when new orders were
definitely improving, and seemed to lag behind new orders at peaks.
The furniture data are difficult to evaluate not only because of the
way they are measured but also because they are subject to strong yet
rather variable seasonal influences. These reflect a particular institu-
tion of the industry, the great furniture markets held four times (in some
periods twice) a year in certain key centers of the trade.32
The months of lead (—)orlag (+) of cancellations at peaks in gross orders, based on unsmoothed,
seasonallyadjusted data, are: January 1923, +13; October 1925, +3;January 1929, —3;June 1933,
+5; March 1937, +7. The average is —5.0 months. At trough dates, the figures are: June 1924, +6;
October 1927, —5; March 1933, —5; September 1934, —4. The average is —2.0 months.
It will be noted (see Chart 2-5) that cancellations declined from a very high level in the first half of
1921; they may well have been even larger earlier in the 1920.-21 recession. Direct evidence on the
behavior of cancellations during that sharp downswing is very scant, but data for a few textile prod-
ucts suggest that some unusually strong spurts in the amounts of orders canceled occurred in 1920
(as shown directly by series for knit underwear and indirectly by the steep declines in new and un-
filled orders and production for cotton goods, all in the second half of 1920; see Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Record Bookof Business Statistics, Part I, Textiles, Washington, D.C.,
1927, pp. 3 1—33, 37—38). These indications are consistent with the statement by Simon Kuznets
that". .. the wholesaler even if he waits for the filling of his order, may cancel it if conditions change.
Such cancellations were epidemic during 1920, and although resorted to with great reluctance, they
are still providing an escape for the wholesaler. The manufacturer is committed to a far greater de-
gree since all his costs of production are already expended" (Cyclical Fluctuations, Retail and
Wholesale Trade, United Stales, /919—1925, New York, 1926, p. 181).
32The largest of these exhibits is the American Furniture Mart in Chicago, but New York, High
Point (N.C.), Grand Rapids, and San Francisco are also important (see Kenneth R. Davis, Furni-
tureMarketing, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957, particularly pp. 88—89, 154—60). The January market is the
most active one, followed by the June—July market, while the others (in the spring and fall) are much
less in evidence. As a result, new orders often show sharp seasonal peaks in January and secondary
peaks in the mid-year (especially in the 1920's). Two seasonal troughs preceding the main market
months are also conspicuous in the furniture orders data: a longer slack in the spring, centered on42Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
The Variability of Orders and the
Behavior of Production
How Firms React to Fluctuations in Orders
Time series on new orders give evidence of great variability in the
demand flows for many manufactured products.33 Few of the many
series examined fail to show sizable cyclical fluctuations, and the
great majority are also subject to pronounced "irregular" movements
from month to month. Seasonal variations, too, are marked in many of
these series; but they are presumably less troublesome as a source of
instability because they are essentially periodic and therefore more
predictable.
To a large extent, fluctuations in manufacturers' new orders are
translated into fluctuations in production. In many industries, condi-
tions of substantially elastic supply seem to prevail over broad ranges
of variation in the output rates. Such conditions favor the use of pro-
duction adjustments in response to changes in demand. But even within
the range of elastic supply it would not be advisable for the firm that
faces highly unstable flows of customer orders to permit its output
flows to be equally unstable. To have each small,, short, up-and-down
movement in new orders followed by a similar movement in production
would be costly and, to the extent that it is avoidable, imprudent. In
fact, a large proportion of this variation is smoothed out in the output
flows through appropriate production scheduling. The resulting di-
vergencies between sales and output are reflected either in product in-
ventory changes or in order backlog changes, depending on whether
sales are executed from stock (so that they coincide with shipments) or
from future production (so that they coincide with advance orders).
This role of stocks and backlogs as "buffers" or "shock absorbers"
April, and a sharp short low in December. Cancellations, on the other hand, show steep peaks in
December and secondary peaks in April or May, and troughs in January—February and in the third
quarter of the year. In short, seasonally, the pattern of cancellations is almost an inverted image of
the pattern of new orders. This contrasts with the positive relation prevailing in the longer move-
ments of these series.
33The statements made in this paragraph are verified in Chapter 3. As argued before, new orders
come closer to measuring actual market demand than do figures on current manufacturing activity
(production or shipments). The term "demand" is used here rather loosely to mean the volume or
value demanded at a given price instead of the function linking the quantities demanded to different
hypothetical prices (and other relevant variables). It is believed that where the term is so used no
serious risk of misunderstanding is involved.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 43
implies also that prices do not change greatly in response to these short
variations in new orders. There is indeed no good reason why even
prices in highly competitive markets should be so "flexible" as to react
to each small quirk in buying which does not force any major decisions
concerning the production levels. Where sellers set prices, considera-
tion of the costs and risks, which will often appear large, would in-
hibit frequent price alterations and revisions.
The larger cyclical movements in buying or ordering are normally
associated with similar major movements in production, as would be
expected. But an expansion of output is limited by existing capacities,
while that of new orders is not. When advance orders reach rates ex-
ceeding those of capacity production and this condition of "excess de-
mand" prevails for some time, a cumulative expansion of the order
backlog is, of course, bound to occur. Where the process is observed,
it must be inferred that prices did not rise sufficiently and in time to
prevent it. To be sure, prices do increase when unfilled orders expand,
but they do so typically in a lagging fashion. The massive backlog ac-
cumulations of recent history reflected growing delivery delays in sev-
eral major manufacturing industries, and it can be argued that prices
would have risen more in the absence of these delays (Chapter 7).
If their degree of "firmness" is sufficiently high, the accumulated or-
ders represent a precontracted volume of work to be done by the sup-
plying firm and the resources it employs. When the demand falls off
again, a firm that emerges from the boom with a large backlog of such
orders can maintain satisfactory levels of production for some time by
drawing upon the backlog. Although the flow of new orders into the
backlog would now proceed at rates smaller than the outflow orders
filled (and the process would involve a return to shorter average de-
livery periods), it might take considerable time before a large backlog
would be reduced enough to lose its usefulness as a means of stabiliz-
ing production.
The role of backlog and delivery-period adjustments in production
to order has an analogy in the role of changes in finished-goods in-
ventories in production to stock. A manufacturer may decide to pro-
duce in excess of current demand when business is slack but expected
to improve in the not too distant future. This would keep equipment
and labor working for stock at times when they would otherwise be
partly idle or laid off; the unsold stock thus accumulated would await44Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
liquidation during the recovery. Of course, unsold stock will often ac-
cumulate because of failure to forecast sales correctly rather than as
a result of this planning for output stabilization. If production con-
tinues to increase for some time after sales have begun to decline, and
is cut only with a lag (which is a frequent result of insufficient fore-
sight), this adds to the amplitude of output fluctuation and thus to out-
put instability. Certainly, whatever their cause, changes in finished in-
ventories need not always result in steadier operations. But an inverted
pattern of movements in those stocks —increasesduring contractions
and decreases during expansions in activity—is in itself an indication
that some stabilization of production relative to fluctuating demand has
been achieved, whether deliberate or not.34
Examples of Production Stabilization
Chart 2-6 suggests that there are great differences among the various
lines of manufacturing in the urgency, method, and effectiveness of
producers' efforts to mitigate the consequences of demand instability.
Each of the four selected products has distinct characteristics that can
be presumed representative of a larger class of goods.35
1. Freight cars illustrate the class of large-sized equipment made
only to order, in time-consuming production processes. Makers of
these capital goods face an extremely unstable flow of demand which
they manage to convert into a flow of current operations that is no more
than moderately variable.
2. Steel sheets represent goods made mostly to order, with much
shorter production and delivery periods. The fluctuations of demand
for this item, while quite pronounced and erratic, are markedly smaller
in percentage units than the movements in freight car orders, and much
more faithfully reproduced in the corresponding activity series. How-
ever, production of steel sheets is noticeably smoother than new or-
ders, and shipments are somewhat smoother than production.
3. The boxboard-paperboard series exemplify goods that are either
shipped from stock or are manufactured promptly upon receipt of or-
der. Here unfilled orders are persistently low (as a rule less than one
month's output), and new orders and production move largely together.
Moses Abramovitz, Inventoriesand Business Cycles, NewYork, NBER, 1950, pp. 260—62.
The selection, originally guided only by a comparative reading of the graphs, was later ration-
alized in the light of the classification of goods by type of manufacture and the underlying meas"res
of the unfilled orders—finished stock ratio.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 45
Chart 2-6
Selected Series on New Orders, Production, and Shipments, Four










































































































































































































































































































































































































































r48Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
The variability of demand is rather mild, so there is much less need and
scope for output stabilization. Indeed, it takes a close inspection of the
paperboard curves to detect where some degree of stabilization has
apparently been achieved.
4. Finally, southern pine lumber typifies a situation that is likely to
prevail for many goods made primarily to stock. Here shipments must
in part be identical with new orders; the two are closely similar, al-
though shipments appear to be smoother. The volume of lumber pro-
duced follows a considerably steadier month-to-month course than the
volumes ordered and shipped, behind which it usually lags slightly.
Hence, it would seem that much of the smoothing has been achieved
by means of stock rather than backlog adjustments.
Implications of Dealing with Aggregates
Since single-product manufacture is seldom encountered in practice
and even less often in statistics, comparing the course of new orders
with that of corresponding production activities usually involves a con-
siderable amount of aggregation over different products.36 Let us con-
sider a multiproduct industry which works against advance orders. If
rises or falls in orders for its various products all reached their peaks
or troughs at precisely the same time, the relative amplitude of move-
ments in the aggregate would equal the mean of the relative amplitudes
of the components weighted according to their base levels. But such a
perfect confluence in timing is most unlikely; the components can be
expected to turn at different times, and this will dampen the amplitude
of the aggregate as compared with the weighted mean amplitude. Other
things being equal, the greater the dispersion in the timing of the com-
ponents the more dampened the amplitude of the aggregate. The same
applies to the aggregate or index showing the current activity of the
industry (its production or shipments). But the timing dispersion may
well be very different for the component order series than for the com-
ponent activity figures. If it is greater. for the latter—perhaps because
of differences of production or delivery periods for the various prod-
ucts of the industry, or because firms deliberately schedule production
38course,even in single-product manufacture, order and production figures are aggregative in
thesenseof being the sum for all firms engaged in making the given commodity. The implications of
this are in certain respects analogous to those of product aggregation, although probably of consid-
erably less practical importance.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 49
of the diverse items so as to mitigate short-term variations in their to-
tal outputs —thenthis is in effect another mechanism whereby much of
the oscillation in new orders received is averaged out in the time-path
of the industry's current activity.
Major Factors in Timing of Orders and Production
Model Sequences and Expected Lags
Pure production to order implies a logical sequence—which is also
the time sequence —ofthree stages of operation: (acceptance of) new
orders, output, and shipments. The lag of output behind new orders
may well be long, due either to a long production period, or a long delay
before new orders are started in production, or both. The lag of ship-
ments behind output would usually be short, perhaps less than one
month and indiscernible in monthly data. This we assume because there
is no general reason why such goods, once produced, should not be
shipped promptly to their purchasers. (All finished inventories are sold,
and it is in the manufacturers' interest to schedule operations so as to
avoid accumulating goods in stock awaiting shipment.)
In pure production to stock, the timing of new orders and shipments
is coincident when the unit period is not too short, say, one month. The
association of orders with output is less simply described. Conceivably,
output could move with, or precede, orders and shipments. Statistical
evidence, however, shows that output of finished nonperishable staples
made from storable materials —aclass of goods best suited to be pro-
duced primarily "for the market," i.e., not against specific orders—
tends to lag behind shipments, though mostly by short intervals. There
are various possible reasons for this. It is usually very difficult to fore-
see turning points in demand, not only for products sold on advance
contracts but also for products sold from stock. Changes in the rate
of current manufacturing operations will presumably require some time
for completion (increases are likely to be particularly time consuming
at higher levels of capacity utilization); consequently, anticipations of
shifts in demand, even if correct, will not lead to timely adjustments of
the production schedules, unless they are formed far enough in ad-
vance. Moreover, the sales forecast will not be regarded as justifying50Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
action which is costly and not easily revocable (especially when changes
in the labor force are involved), unless the judgment about the future
is sufficiently long range and is held with sufficient confidence.37
Arguing by inference from the model sequences, one can form cer-
tain definite expectations regarding the lags of output and shipments
vis-à-vis new orders for products that are identifiable by type of manu-
facture:
1. Output of staples made for the market may tend to lag behind de-
mand as measured by sales or orders shipped from stock. But output
of precontracted goods lags behind demand as measured by sales (or-
ders received in advance of production) constantly, in what is a nec-
essary relation, not just a tendency. This is logically an important qual-
itative difference.
2. The lags of shipments relative to new orders should usually be
negligible for goods ordinarily sold from stock. In the case of an item
shipped from inventory directly upon receipt of an order, this lag ob-
viously approximates zero. In times of booming business, however, the
delivery periods 38 will lengthen as rising demand exhausts the available
product inventory and exceeds the capacity of the firms to fill orders
on receipt, causing unfilled orders to accumulate. For goods made to
order, of course, the shipment lags are always positive and never zero,
because production always intervenes between the date of the advance
sales contract and the date of shipment, and production always requires
some time.
"Production period," defined as the average amount of time needed
to produce a unit of a given item, is a loose term and indeed an elusive
concept. In modern continuous mass production of standardized goods,
this period will often be very short; one may neglect it in writing the
production function without any input-output lags. A popular car, for
example, may be produced at the rate of 2,000 automobiles per day, or
three per minute. But the production of a new model of a car requires
The argument presented in the above paragraph follows the lines of explanation given in Abra-
movitz, Inventories, pp. 256—62; see ibid. for a more detailed analysis of the forces involved.
38Forstylistic variety and convenience, the lags of shipments behind new orders are sometimes
called the "delivery periods" or "delivery lags." It is, of course, recognized that the dates of ship-
ment and delivery are separated by the time needed for transportation, but this interval should
usually be short—less than the unit period in our data, which is one month or one quarter. Disre-
garding the difference between shipments and deliveries in terminology will cause no error in the
context of this study.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 51
months of research, planning, designing, and testing. In job-order pro-
duction of capital equipment to customer specifications, the situation
is often similar. The production periods for the more standardized
goods manufactured to order may fall anywhere between these ex-
tremes. Clearly, the production periods depend on and change with the
available technology, but the conditions determining what we have
labeled the "type of manufacture" are here again relevant.
The measures of the average lag of output relative to new orders dis-
close some marked interindustry differences which accord with the
above considerations. The longest lags by far are concentrated in the
area of "heavy" capital goods produced to order (Chapter 4).
On the other hand, short-term fluctuations in the duration of output
lags for a given industry cannot, as a rule, be ascribed to changes in the
average production period over time. Technological developments may
produce trends in the production periods, but one would not expect
them to cause cyclical movements in the latter. Instead, the short-term
changes in the output lags are apparently related to changes in the back-
log position and capacity utilization of the firms that fill the orders.
Where customer orders anticipate and commit future output, whether
because of a consistent policy of the firm (as in regular manufacture to
order) or temporarily under pressure of booming demand (as may be
the case even for items that are at other times well stocked by manu-
facturers and promptly available), the time interval between the accept-
ance of an order and its material execution cannot be shorter than the
minimum production period involved. But when demand continues high
for some time and advance orders pile up, the average interval between
booking a new order and the beginning date for the work on it must
lengthen relative to the essentially stable production period. Thus, of
the two components of the total order-output intervals —thetime the
order has to wait before it is started in production, and the time needed
for the actual production process —theformer may then indeed become
much the longer one. Certainly the former will have increased, often
substantially, while the latter may have shortened or lengthened some-
what (efforts to rush orders through may succeed to a certain extent,
or they may be "overdone" and self-defeating), but probably it will not
have changed much.
Since in such times finished output is presumably promptly accepted
by the buyer, the argument can be stated directly in terms of the order-52Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
shipment lags. These delivery lags, then, will lengthen in the advanced
stages of expansion as a result of an increase in the "waiting periods"
on the accumulated orders.
Problems of Measurement and Aggregation
Tracing the history of any particular order to ascertain how much
time elapsed between the date it was accepted and the date it was pro-
duced or shipped is often impossible and rarely practical. Our measures
of timing of new orders relative to shipments and production (Chapter
4) are based on aggregative time series data in which individual orders
cannot be identified. In a large part, these measures refer to the length
and regularity of intervals between the similar specific-cycle turns in
new orders and output or shipments—peaks or troughs which appar-
ently bound corresponding upward and downward movements. Here
the lags of activity relative to orders are observed only at certain crit-
ical turning points, not in the continual succession which can be pre-
sumed to be their characteristic. However, much if not all the evidence
from the series being compared is shifted and weighed in identifying
the turning points in the series. Also, additional measurements of such
lags can be derived by matching and comparing the timing of the turns
in shorter movements that these series exhibit.
Lagged regressions provide a different method in which all the ob-
servations in the related time series are utilized. The criterion of maxi-
mum correlation can be applied to establish the optimal lags. In ordi-
nary regression analysis, however, the lags are assumed to be constant
for each given relationship, whereas the lags here considered are likely
to show certain systematic changes over time, as already noted.
These considerations suggest the use of both timing comparisons
and regression analysis as complementary tools. Further steps will lead
to regressions incorporating distributed and variable lags.
Random variation is one major source of measurement difficulties;
aggregation is another. The former affects strongly the method of tim-
ing comparisons. Large, short, and erratic movements often obscure
the cyclical behavior of the series compared and make the dates of their
turning points uncertain. Thus, even in the most straightforward case
of a single product manufactured to order, occasional lapses from the
expected timing sequence may be encountered for technical reasons.
While this problem can be lessened by using averages of the individualThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 53
measures, there are few series that are sufficiently long to provide rep-
resentative timing averages.
Industry aggregates represent typically diversified multiproduct
firms. Hence they often cover goods made to order as well as goods
made to stock. The problems of interpretation caused thereby could be
very serious, but for the most part do not turn out so in practice. As
suggested by the evidence presented earlier in this chapter, many of
the industrial aggregates are marked by a prevalence of one or the other
type of manufacture. Where this is so, average lag measures tend to
reflect, albeit in muted form, the timing patterns expected of the dom-
inant category.
Table 2-3 provides a hypothetical illustration of the differential tim-
ing sequences that would be generated by a given flow of new orders
under two assumptions regarding the proportion of business handled
from stock. We abstract in this scheme from several features that add
to the complexity of the empirical relations between new orders and
current production activities: incoming business is taken to move in
smooth (but not symmetrical) cycles; no representation is given to the
process of subduing the fluctuation in output relative to that in orders
which was briefly discussed before; and simple, constant timing asso-
ciations between the corresponding series are assumed throughout.
Two models are distinguished, one in which three-fourths of orders
received are filled from future production (A) and one-fourth from
stock (B), the other in which the proportions are reversed (that is, com-
ponent A accounts for one-fourth and B for three-fourths of total new
business). For A it is assumed that output, equal to shipments, lags new
orders by two periods; for B, that output lags new orders and ship-
ments, which are equal, by one period. In Model One, where A out-
weighs B three to one, timing characteristics of A prevail in the rela-
tion between the totals for new orders, output, and shipments. In
Model Two, where the weights are reversed in favor of B, timing char-
acteristics of B dominate the aggregate relations. But timing observa-
tions depend also on the way in which new orders vary about their turn-
ing points. Thus at the last trough in new orders in Model One (period
10), the timing of shipments turns out to be different for the totals than
for the dominant component A (see columns 2 and 6). This can be due
only to the particular pattern of the rates of change in orders during the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.56Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
(periods 2—6), which shows a retardation before this peak, this con-
traction ends on a reaccelerated decline.
The lead of new orders relative to shipments results in a cyclical
movement of unfilled orders that conforms positively to the cycle in
demand (new orders), while the lead of shipments relative to output
results in a movement of finished stock that conforms negatively (col-
umns 8 and 10). The leads alone are sufficient to produce these pat-
terns; no particular assumptions about the relative amplitudes of new
orders, shipments, and output are necessary for that. But in fact new
orders are subject to larger fluctuations than shipments. This results
in larger amplitudes of the corresponding movements in the unfilled
orders backlog, both absolutely and relative to shipments. Similarly,
if output fluctuates less than orders shipped on receipt, the inverted
cycles in finished inventory are correspondingly increased.
The Structure and Variability of Lags in Filling Orders
Let St be a firm's shipments of a certain product and nt be new orders
for that item which the firm has received, with trelatingto some short
unit period, say, one month. In general, St can be viewed as a weighted
sum of new orders previously received. Thus,
= + aiflt_i + aznt_2 += I =0,1, ..., m,(1)
where the summation extends from ito m, and m reaches as far back
as necessary to cover the entire relevant past.
In practice, some of the a's will, of course, be zero. In particular, for
production to stock, a0 =1and=O,j=1,2,..., m,when it is as-
sumed that shipments can always be executed from stock without any
significant delay. Similarly, in the simplest case of production to order
with a constant delivery period k, all the a coefficients would be zero,
except that of nt—k; for example, if k =2(months), then a1I for i2
and 0 for I2.
However, where manufacture to order is involved, there will ordi-
narily be more than one nonzero (positive) a coefficient in an equation
such as (I); that is, the lags will be distributed rather than simple. For
some products, it may be meaningful to think of a technologically de-
fined minimum delivery period, but even there longer periods are fea-
sible and may under certain circumstances be economically preferable.
Technology alone does not determine production schedules, whichThe Role of Orders in Industrial Production 57
ratherare influenced by economic factors such as demand expecta-
tions, supply conditions including availability and prices, and the like.
In particular, a firm will, ceterisparibus, prefera more stable flow of
output to one that varies greatly, since large short-term variations in
the production rates add to the costs. The attempt to stabilize opera-
tions is likely to involve some smoothing of the impact of new orders
by scheduling production to make it less variable than the incoming
business. This means a policy of substituting distributed for simple de-
livery lags; for, in the case of a single constant delivery period k,the
flow of output and shipments would be just a replica of the flow of new
orders, lagged by k,andthis is precisely what the firm would notwant,
assuming that it desires to reduce the variability of St.
Anotherreason is that the rate per unit period at which new orders
are received may at times exceed the rate at which the orders can be
filled. This happens when the incoming business strains the capacity
to produce, and it implies a lengthening of the average delivery periods
agreed upon by the contracting parties or imposed upon the buyer. In
terms of the distributed lags, this means a shift in the weights, which
are now lighter for the more recent and heavier for the more distant
past. Hence, not only are the lags distributed, but they are also varia-
ble: in times of high capacity utilization the longer lags become more
and the shorter lags become less important.
When applied to aggregates comprising groups of firms (industries)
and groups of products, we shall have, analogously to (1),
S= i=O, 1,..., m,(la)
with the summation taken over the same range as in (1). Aggregation
supplies additional reasons for the delivery lags being distributed
rather than simple. Even in a single-product industry, summation over
different firms would work in this direction, since the delivery periods
are unlikely to be always identical for all the firms. In a multiproduct
industry, aggregation over the different products also is likely to result
in a differentiation of the lags.
Typically, the available data are industry totals, so that (la) rather
than (1) can be estimated. In all applications of (la) as a regression
model based on time series data, the estimates of the a's have, of course,
the meaning of temporal averages. They represent the average effects
upon St of etc.Even if at any given time the delivery lag for58Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
any item were of the simple rather than distributed type, variations over
time in these orders-to-shipments intervals could produce sufficiently
large deviations from the mean to make the distributed-lag model su-
perior to the simple-lag model. Thus the results of such regressions in-
corporate the combined effect of all the involved types of aggregation
—over firms, products, and time.
As usual, aggregation is necessary to simplify and generalize but it
also creates problems. Changes in the product mix, for example, will
affect the results of applications of (la) to industry totals. But to the
extent that such changes in the aggregates involved are random rather
than systematic, they would cause no bias and could be disregarded.
And in some cases where they do matter, some disaggregation may be
possible and helpful.
Those changes in the delivery lags, however, which come about be-
cause of cyclical changes in resource utilization present a different and
more substantive problem. They are systematic and may occur at any
level of industry aggregation. They can, therefore, be neither ignored
nor handled by disaggregation. The answer lies in studying the lags in
the context of business cycles; separately at peaks and at troughs, for
example, or as a function of the demand pressure (which may be meas-
ured by the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments or indexes of capacity
utilization).39
Manufacturers' Orders as Target and Tool of Forecasts
On the Quality and Functions of Orders Forecasts
Uncertainty about future demand, when sufficiently high, contributes
a motive for production to order. If the sales of a specific product can
be fairly accurately predicted, then this item, whatever its other char-
acteristics, is likely to be produced to stock rather than to order (as-
suming, of course, that production is expected to be profitable). It is
where sales appear to be particularly difficult to predict and where the
costs of acting upon wrong forecasts are punitive that production will
follow advance orders.
Evidencebearing on these relationships is presented in several parts of this book: in the com-
parisons of the amplitudes of new orders, output, and shipments during cyclical and shorter move-
ments (Chapter 3); in the estimates of lags of shipments and output behind new orders (Chapters 4
and 5);andin the discussion of the behavior and function of unfilled orders (Chapter 6).The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 59
Nevertheless, forecasts of future sales exist even in manufacturing
to order, presumably because they are needed for planning purchases
of materials in the short run and also for planning production, fixed in-
vestment, and the work force in the long run. For nonelectrical machin-
ery, an industry in which production to order prevails, forecasts of new
orders are collected by the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. The
forecasts are reported quarterly for the industry as a whole and for six
subgroups 40by50 to 60 large companies; they begin in 1956 and cover
spans of one to four quarters ahead. Seasonally adjusted indexes,
1950 =100,are compiled by McGraw-Hill from these forecast figures,
to match series on the actual flow of orders reported in the same form.
Recently, an accuracy analysis of the aggregate forecasting index
for all companies reporting in 1956—65 has been carried out by George
Terborgh.4' The performance of this forecasting series was found to be
very poor, as illustrated in Table 2-4. In fact, the deviations of pre-
dicted from actual changes have on the average been larger than the
actual changes themselves (compare columns 4 and 5). This implies
that predicting that there would be no change from the last known level
of new orders would have yielded smaller errors than predicting with
the index based on the companies' reported forecasts; in other words,
the forecasts in the aggregate have been worse than the extrapolations
of the last level.
This finding shows the forecasting index for nonelectrical machinery
orders to be definitely inferior to most forecasts by business economists
of such series as GNP and its major components and industrial produc-
tion. These forecasts have typically been better than the simple last-
level projections; and most of the GNP and industrial production fore-
casts in the postwar period show better over-all scores than even the
more sophisticated extrapolations of past trends or of the relations be-
tween several recent values of the series concerned. This is true for
predictions of the next two or three quarters and of the average annual
values.42
The errors increase systematically with the span of the forecast, as
can be seen by reading down columns 1—4 in Table 2-4. This would be
40Seenote 28above.Construction machinery is combinedwith mining machinery.
41 Machineryand Allied Products institute, CapitalGoods Review,No. 64, Washington, D.C.,
December 1965.
42SeeVictor Zarnowitz, An Appraisalof Short-Term Economic Forecasts. OccasionalPaper
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Table 2-4
Average Errors of Forecasts and Average Actual Changes, New
Orders for Nonelectrical Machinery, Quarterly, 1956—65
(per cent)




Span of Forecasta1956—58 1959—62 1963—65 1956—65 1956—65
(no. of quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One 7.2 3.7 6.0 5.4 4.7
Two 8.9 6.4 9.9 8.1 7.4
Three 11.1 7.8 16.0 11.1 ' 10.6
Four 10.3 8.3 19.0 12.1 12.5
Source: Machinery and Allied Products Institute, CapitalGoods Review, December
1965.
aIntervalbetween the last quarter for which actual orders are known at the time of
forecast and the quarter to which the forecast refers. For example, for a forecast made in
mid-January the last known quarter is the fourth quarter of the preceding year; the fore-
cast with the one-quarter span refers to the first quarter of the current year (in which the
respondent stands); the two-quarter span reaches into the second quarter of the current
year; etc. The forecasts are made in January, April, July, and October.
bAveragestaken without regard to sign over the deviations between actual and pre-
dicted percentage changes from the base quarter to the target quarter. The first forecast
covers 11-1956; the last, 111-1965.
Averages taken without regard to sign over the actual percentages changes from the
base quarter to the target quarter. Comparable to the corresponding entries in column 4.
expected, and it has been shown elsewhere for a variety of aggregative
forecasts.43 But the average change in the observed values also in-
creases with the span (column 5). In fact, the rise in the actual change
is faster than that in the average forecast error; so the errors, when
taken relative to the changes, decrease with the predictive span. This
means that the forecasts improve somewhat relative to the extrapola-
tions based on the no-change assumption when the distance between
the base and the target period is lengthened, until, for the four-quarter
span, the forecasts appear to be slightly more accurate than such "na-
ive-model" extrapolations.44
Ibid., Chap. 5.
Among theGNPand industrial production forecasts reviewed in ibid.,onecan find somesim-The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 61
The forecasts for the subperiod 1959—62 were definitely more ac-
curate than those for either the earlier (1956—58) or the later years
(1963—65). The worst forecasts were made in the most recent years
(except for the shortest forecasts, which were worst in 1956—58; com-
pare columns 1—3 in Table 2—4). This, as noted in the evaluation by
the Machinery and Allied Products Institute, probably occurred be-
cause in 1959—62 the reported nonelectrical machinery orders showed
a fairly steady and moderate advance of the kind that is often expected
and comparatively easy to predict. In contrast, the same series expe-
rienced in the earlier period a substantial decline and recovery in con-
nection with the 1957—58 business recession. The decline was missed,
which gave rise to large overestimates of the level of orders during the
recession, while the subsequent improvement was significantly under-
rated. The forecasts have generally failed to signal the cyclical turns
in this period (they seem to have done someWhat better in this respect
during the declines of orders in 1960—61 and 1962). As for the 1963—65
period, it was characterized by a steeper rise of orders than that ob-
served in the recent past. Even though this new, faster advance was
quite steady, forecasters continued to underestimate it by large mar-
gins; they "simply refused to believe that the trend could be main-
tained."
The McGraw-Hill series shows the average predictive performance
of all companies reporting, not the performance of any single one of
them. No doubt, some of the respondents have done better than the
average, and others have done worse. I have no knowledge of any com-
pany scores, but, if the experience with other groups of forecasts is a
guide, the better-than-average scores should be decidedly a minority.
In terms of the summary measures of error overtime, the average fore-
cast for a group is typically more accurate than most of the forecasts
for individual members of the group because the former is helped in
the long run by the cancellation of individual errors of opposite sign.46
Few sources of potential strength seem to exist for microforecasts
of advance orders, and none are clearly reliable. Current inquiries from
liar examples of longer forecasts being better than the short ones in comparison to the naive model
here employed, although counterexamptes also exist and the observed relations are not very strong
or regular. When compared to the more effective extrapolations of trends or autoregressive relations,
forecasts typically come out worse rather than better for the longer spans (see ibid.,Table18 and
the text).
Capital Goods Review,No. 64, December 1965.
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old and prospective customers may provide some guidance; but they
are probably at best short-run indications and may well be too sporadic
or informal to be really helpful. One can presume that sales experience
or knowledge of the past behavior of orders received should work to
improve the company forecasts; but the past record will be of little as-
sistance where the inflow of new orders is irregular. It would not be
surprising, therefore, if the ability to predict new orders on the level
of the individual firm were generally quite limited, as the above evi-
dence for nonelectrical machinery suggests it is.
However, another possible, partial reason for the weakness of these
forecasts is that the effort invested in them is rather small because the
needs they are to serve are modest. As argued earlier, advance orders
themselves represent an important guide to production, thereby pre-
empting, at least in part, the function which in manufacture to stock
must be performed by sales forecasts.
Sales Forecasts and the Predictive Properties of Orders
New orders are difficult to predict as such but, once known, should
be decidedly helpful in predicting shipments (often referred to as
"sales"). They certainly make a better tool than a target of forecasts.
If new orders help businessmen to predict their sales more accu-
rately, then the sales forecasts should be better in those industries
which receive advance orders for large proportions of their outputs.
Recent evidence suggests that sales anticipations are indeed substan-
tially better predictors in the durable goods sector of manufacturing,
where production to order is generally important, than in the nondura-
ble goods sector, where this is not the case.
These results come from Michael Lovell's study of new data from
the Quarterly Manufacturers' Inventory and Sales Anticipation Survey
conducted by the Office of Business Economics, Department of Com-
merce.47 This survey, initiated in the fall of 1957, was at first (through
1958) semiannual; continuous and comparable observations on antic-
ipated and actual values are available only for a short period ending
in 1963, since later figures are on a revised basis. While the older sales
anticipations data, of more limited coverage and perhaps of lower qual-
Michael C. LoveJi, "Sales Anticipations, Planned Inventory Investment, and Realizations," in
Deier,njnaii(sof JiwestineniBehavior, U Bureau Conference 18, New York,
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ity, give poor or indifferent results, the predictive performance of the
present series appears to be more satisfactory.48
The OBE survey collects figures on sales expected in the current
and the immediately following quarter, as well as reports on actual
sales in the preceding quarter. The "second anticipations," which refer
to the current quarter, are only in part forecasts and very short-term
at that. They reflect in about equal measure the knowledge of actual
current sales, since the survey is taken close to the middle of the quar-
ter to which they refer. Their deviations from the corresponding figures
on actual sales would be expected to be small and essentially random.49
It is therefore not surprising that the correlations between these antic-
ipations and actual sales are high for most industries. But it is worth
noting that they are definitely higher for durable goods than for non-
durables. The adjusted determination coefficients (P2) are .962 for the
durables aggregate and .620 for the nondurables one.5°
The first anticipations relating to the next quarter are of more inter-
est. As would be expected, they show lower correlations with actual
sales than do the second anticipations, which have a much shorter span.
On the whole, however, these correlations are still fairly high for the
durable goods industries: the coefficients P2 exceed .8 for two, and ex-
ceed .5 for five of the seven components of this sector. For the aggre-
gates of durable goods, p2= .73 8. The results for the nondurable goods
industries are, again, considerably worse, e.g., four of the seven P2 co-
efficients for the components of this sector are less than .5.Thecoeffi-
cient for the aggregates of nondurable goods is .483.
An industry that does receive advance orders for many of its prod-
ucts may of course still have relatively poor sales forecasts because
48 olderdata include the Railroad Shippers', Fortune,andDun and Bradstreet surveys, and
the sales anticipations data reported as a by-product of the Commerce-SEC annual survey of in-
tended business expenditures on plant and equipment. They have been evaluated in numerous stud-
ies, notably Robert Ferber, TheRailroad Shippers' Forecasts,Urbana, 1953; F. Modigliani and
0. H. Sauerlarider, "Economic Expectations and Plans in Relation to Short-Term Economic
Forecasting," Short-Term Economic Forecasting, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 17, Princeton
for NBER, 1955, pp. 261—351; Peter B. Pashigian, "The Accuracy of the Commerce-SEC Sales
Anticipations," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1964, pp. 398—405; and several
papers in The Quality and Economic Sigmficance of Anticipations Data, Universities—National
Bureau Conference 10, Princeton for NBER, 1960.
Compare Robert Eisner's "Comment" on Lovell's paper, in Determinants of Investment Be-
havior, p. 595.
50Furthermore,four of the seven major component industries listed for the durable goods sector
show pt> .9, and the remaining three have P of the order of .7. The seven component nondurable
goods industries covered have substantially lower p2 coefficients, ranging from .8 down to less than
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of the greater variability of its sales (or for other, individually probably
less important reasons which may make some series harder to predict
or some forecasters less able or less lucky than others). By the same
token, an industry selling mainly from stock may have a relatively good
forecasting record. There are apparent illustrations of this in some of
the differences in the performance of sales anticipations among the
component durable goods industries.5'
Lovell also presents measures for the predictive accuracy of the new
OBE anticipations data relative to a naive model of the "same as last
level" variety.52 Once more, according to these ratios of average ab-
solute errors, the durable goods industries have produced much better
sales forecasts than the nondurable goods ones. All the ratios for the
durables are less than 1, that is, the errors of the anticipations average
less than those of the naive model (the former being used in the numer-
ator and the latter in the denominator of each ratio). The ratio for the
aggregate durable goods sector is 0.42. The ratios for the nondurables
are generally higher and exceed unity for two industries. The ratio for
aggregate nondurables is 0.64.
Further tests by Lovell consisted of regressions of actual sales change
on anticipated sales change, seasonal dummy variables, and a trend
term. Presenting partial correlations of actual, with anticipated change,
Loveil notes that "while these partial coefficients are quite high in a
number of durable industries, it is apparent...thatthe anticipated
change makes a negligible contribution toward predicting the seasonally
adjusted actual change in most nondurable industries."
Using the same detailed anticipations data, furnished by courtesy of
the Office of Business Economics, I was able to reexamine the rela-
tions between actual and anticipated sales, including new orders re-
'INonautomotivetransportationequipment, an industry producinglargelyto order with highly
variable sales, shows a lowof.325.Thegroup of other durables, where production to stock is
more important and sales are much less variable, has a higher F2,.537. (Butthis group comes out
worst of all durables in comparisons with a naive model, which are described in the next paragraph.)
'2The model produces extrapolations = where denotesactual sales i
quartersearlier. This amounts to adjusting the same quarter of the preceding year by the recently
observed trend (or, alternatively, to adjusting the preceding quarter for the change observed last
year, since E?*= thusthe formula involves a crude seasonal correction). The test
was introduced by Ferber in his 1953 study (see reference in note 48).
Lovell, "Sales Anticipations," pp. 548—49. The partial correlation coefficient, squared and ad-
justed for degrees of freedom, is .444 for aggregate durables. Corresponding measures are reported
for only three nondurable goods industries, where they are less than .1. Even for the second antic-
ipations, the partials are insignificant for the nondurables (here.the sectoral value of the partial is
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ceived ahead of the target period. It was possible to match data for six-
teen quarterly intervals in the period 111-1959—11-1963 and to cover
four major durable goods industries. Tests confirmed that the sales an-
ticipations are best treated as seasonally unadjusted. Regressions with
seasonal dummy variables were selected as the most acceptable method
of handling the problem.
Second anticipations, issued in the first half of the target quarter, are
more closely associated with actual sales than are new orders received
in the preceding quarter. This accords with expectation and, because of
the partial overlap and the short predictive span involved, is viewed
more as a sign of consistency and reasonable promptness of current
information about sales than as a mark of superior ability to forecast.
In Table 2-5, therefore, only the first anticipations, which refer to the
next quarter, are included. The table presents regressions of the form
St=a+bSa+cNt_i+wiDi+w2Dz+w3Da_ut, (2)
with=actualsales in quarter t;safirstanticipations of sales (is-
sued in the first half of quarter t— 1); =neworders received in
quarter t— 1;(1= 1, 2, 3) =seasonaldummy variables which equal
unity in the ith quarter and zero in all other quarters; and=residuals.
Only new orders received in quarter t— 1are incorporated in these
regressions; the term representing the earlier orders, proved to
be of little or no significance when used instead of and there is no
need here to use both.
In three of the four industries covered in Table 2-6, new orders
are shown to be more closely associated with actual shipments or sales
(S1), than are the first sales anticipations (S°). For primary iron and steel
the latter variable has a negative (but in all likelihood not significant)
coefficient. For both machinery industries, the partial correlations of
St with (column 6) are higher than those ofwith sa(column5).
In transportation equipment, however, the situation is reversed: here
saishighly significant and N1_1 is not.
If the partial r ofwith Sa, net of the effects of andis sig-
nificantly positive, then samusthave some predictive value that is not
contained in new orders indeed, this coefficient (or better, its
squared and adjusted form) is a measure of the net contribution of sa
tothe prediction ofAt the same time, if the partial r ofwith
net of the effects ofand Df, is significantly positive, then must66Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Table 2-5
Regressionsof Sales (Value of Shipments) on Sales Anticipations,















Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary iron and steeP' 2.359 —0.216 .616 .618—.310 .797
(0.914) (0.250) (.177)
Machinery, except electrical—0.834 0.457 .641 .961 .726 .866
(0.699)(0.137)(.117)
Electrical machinery —0.028 0.423 .609 .818.486 .690
(0.968) (0.24 1)(.202)
Transportation equipmente—4.540 1.177 .224 .800.698 .297
(3.435) (0.402) (.240)
a Equation (2) is used for the estimate. For the notation, see the text. The coefficients
of the dummy variable, D1—w1, w2, and w3—in that order, are: primary iron and steel:
0.052, 0.3 11*, 0.03 1; machinery, except electrical: 0.102, 0.274*, _0.525*; electrical
machinery: —0.062, —0.404; transportation equipment: _0.636*, 0.570,
0.318. Most of these coefficients are smaller than their standard errors; those that are
larger, and possibly statistically significant, are marked with an asterisk.
bColumn2 gives the coefficient of S0. Column 3 gives it for N1_1. The standard errors
are in parentheses beneath the coefficients.
CColumn5 shows the partial correlation coefficient ofwith Se', net of the effects of
and the seasonal factorscolumn 6, the partial ofwith N1_1, net of the effects
of5°and D1.
dExcludesthree quarters strongly affected by a major steel strike: 111-1959, IV-1959,
and 1-1960.
eTotalof automotive and nonautomotive.
have some predictive power that was not used in the sales forecast Sa.
Wherethat coefficient is large, as it is for the primary iron and the two
machinery industries, the forecast could presumably be much improved
by better utilization of the available information on recently received
orders.54
54Thisparagraph and the following one apply certain concepts developed in Jacob Mincer and
VictorZarnowitz, "The Evaluation of Economic Forecasts," in J. Mincer, ed., Economic Forecasts
andExpectations: Analysesof Forecasting Behaviorand Performance,New York, NBER, 1969.The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 67
Measures of direct association between saand give us an idea
of how important recent orders are as a codetermining factor or "in-
gredient" of first sales anticipations. These correlation statistics are
shown in Table 2-6. They suggest that the anticipations of primary iron
and steel and machinery sales have much in common with new orders,
even net of the seasonal influences (first three lines, columns 1—3). The
lowest correlations are obtained for transportation equipment, where,
it will be recalled, sahasbeen relatively efficient as an estimator of
while has been poor in this role (Table 2-6, last line). It is, of
course, sensible for the anticipations to have a weaker association with
orders whenever the latter are less helpful in predicting sales.
The addition of orders received in quarter t —2contributes little
to the correlations in Table 2-6, except for nonelectrical machinery,
where the combined effect of and on saisstrong (third line).
Finally, a caveatmustbe issued: it should be clear that the correla-
tions in Table 2-6 are generally not high enough to yield results con-
Table 2-6
Correlations of Sales Anticipations with New Orders and Seasonal
Terms,a Four Major Manufacturing Industries, Quarterly, 1959—63
Industry































a Forthe notation, see the text accompanying equation (2), above.
bThesimple correlation is of sawithN1_1. The partial is of sawithN1_1, net of the
effects of D1. The multiple is ofwith and D.. Column 4 shows R2, the adjusted
coefficient of determination.
The multiple correlation coefficient is in column 5. Column 6 shows the adjusted co-
efficient of determination.
ciExcludesthree quarters affected by the steel strike: 111-1959, IV-1959, and 1-1960.68Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
ventionally regarded as significant after adjustments have been made
for the degrees of freedom. The numbers of observations are small (13
to 16); consequently, the adjustments reduce the coefficients substan-
tially. The values of R2 in Table 2-6 are accordingly low, except for the
above-mentioned case of nonelectrical machinery (columns 4 and 6).
Summary
The demand for some goods is so differentiated or unstable or sporadic,
and consequently the cost of storing them unsold in finished form is so
high, that these goods are produced primarily to order rather than to
stock. For products that are typically made to order, the average ratios
of finished inventories to unfilled orders (Q/U)are relatively low, while
for products that are typically made to stock the Q/U ratios are high.
Although they tend to fall in prosperous times and rise in sluggish ones,
the ratios generally exceed 1 (Q >U)in most nondurable goods in-
dustries and are generally less than 1 (Q< U)in most durable goods
industries. Manufacture to order is particularly important in metals,
machinery, and nonautomotive transportation equipment —industries
producing mainly capital goods.
Cancellations of orders received by manufacturers appear to be on
the average relatively small for a variety of products, but they have
been large at certain times on military and defense-related contracts.
The amount and rate of cancellations increase with, but lag behind, new
orders.
New orders (N) and shipments (S) tend to coincide in production to
stock. In contrast, N leads S in production to order, with output (Z)
intervening. Here changes in unfilled orders that reflect adjustments of
delivery periods can absorb much of the variation of incoming business,
thus making the course of Z and S considerably smoother than the
course of N.
New orders for many manufactured goods are highly variable in the
short run and difficult to predict. Sales forecasts are likely to have
frequent serious errors and, if the costs of acting on wrong sales fore-
casts are critically high, production tends to follow advance orders.
Forecasts of future sales (new orders) exist even in manufacture to or-
der but they presumably have a less important function than in produc-The Role of Orders in Industrial Production 69
tion to stock and may command less care and attention. Certainly the
available evidence indicates that company forecasts of incoming or-
ders tend to have little predictive value.
Advance orders, while themselves poorly predicted, can help busi-
nessmen predict their sales more accurately. Thus, sales anticipations
appear to be substantially better predictors in the durable goods indus-
tries, where production to order is generally important, than in the non-
durable goods sector, where this is not the case.
To conclude, in a large segment of the economy orders perform an
important role in guiding production. Quantitative evidence on the re-
lationships involved is unfolded in the chapters that follow.